Desperately Seeking Subsidiarity: Danish Private Law in the Scandinavian, European, and Global Context by Lookofsky, Joseph




DESPARATELY SEEKING SUBSIDIARITY: 
DANISH PRIVATE LAW IN THE 
SCANDINAVIAN, EUROPEAN, AND GLOBAL 
CONTEXT 
JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY* 
THE SIXTH ANNUAL HERBERT L. BERNSTEIN MEMORIAL 
LECTURE IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 
AS HELD AT DUKE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF  LAW 
NOVEMBER 13, 2007 
NOTE FROM THE EDITOR 
In this volume the DJCIL is pleased to publish Professor Joseph 
Lookofsky's Bernstein Memorial Lecture held last November at Duke 
University School of Law, as well as the introductory remarks 
presented on that occasion by Dean David Levi and Professor Paul 
Haagen. 
The text which follows the introductions consists mainly of a 
verbatim transcription of Professor Lookofsky's lecture. However, 
since his lecture at Duke was enhanced by a series of graphic (on-
screen) illustrations, the DJCIL editors and Professor Lookofsky have 
found it appropriate to edit and adjust selected passages in the 
transcription, so as to retain the gist of the illustrations and thus the 
essence of the original lecture. Readers can also (re)experience the 
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preparation of the Bernstein Memorial Lecture at Duke. 
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DEAN DAVID F. LEVI** 
Welcome to the Sixth Annual Herbert L. Bernstein Memorial 
Lecture. This lecture series celebrates the life's work of Professor 
Bernstein, who was a wonderful teacher, scholar and colleague at 
Duke Law School for 17 years before he passed away in 2001. 
Born in Hamburg, Professor Bernstein had a harrowing boyhood 
during World War II. He was educated at the University of Hamburg, 
distinguished himself as a practitioner and scholar of the law at an 
early age, and eventually made his way to the University of Michigan 
Law School in 1962. He then taught at the Universities of Hamburg, 
Berkeley, and Southampton before coming to Duke in 1984. His 
fields of scholarship included comparative and private international 
law. 
Professor Bernstein was a much beloved figure here at Duke. 
Because I did not have the privilege of knowing him personally, I've 
talked to others who did, and certain words and phrases constantly 
recur. People recall his respect for others, his warmth, his kindness, 
that he was a gentleman of the old school, his commitment to justice, 
his wonderful sense of humor. It's clear that he had a profound effect 
on all of those who were fortunate enough to come to know him. 
It's a particular pleasure to see that his wife, Professor 
Bernstein's wife, Waltraud Bernstein is able to be with us here today. 
Thank you for coming. 
This speaker series is made possible by the Duke Center for 
Comparative & International Law as well as by contributions from 
Professor Bernstein's many friends and from the alumni of this law 
school, and we are grateful to all of those who have made possible 
this wonderful event. 
We are honored to welcome here to Duke one who is no stranger 
to Duke. Professor Joseph Lookofsky of the University of 
Copenhagen will be delivering the Bernstein Lecture today. A friend 
and colleague of Professor Bernstein, it is fit and proper that he 
should be our speaker here today.  Introducing Professor Lookofsky 
is our own Professor Paul Haagen. Professor Haagen is a scholar of 
history and law. He was a Rhodes scholar. He holds a Ph.D in history 
from Princeton and a J.D. from Yale. He joined our law school in 
1985.  His scholarship focuses on contacts and arbitration, particularly 
in the professional sports arena, as well as in the social history of law. 
 
 ** Dean David F. Levi is Dean and Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. 
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He's particularly interested in debtors and debtor's prison.  Professor 
Haagen. 
PROFESSOR PAUL H. HAAGEN*** 
And I am indebted to Dean Levi for those comments. As Dean 
Levi noted, this is the Sixth Herbert Bernstein Memorial Lecture in 
International and Comparative law. It is a series that gives those of us 
who knew and had the privilege to work with Herbert a time and 
opportunity to reflect on his many contributions to this institution and 
to the field of international and comparative law. 
Herbert was a wonderful colleague, a man of penetrating 
intellect, grace, dignity and deep humanity. It's a great honor and 
privilege to introduce and welcome back to Duke Law School Joseph 
Lookofsky, Professor of Obligations and private International Law at 
the University of Copenhagen, and among his many other 
accomplishments, Herbert Bernstein's distinguished co-author, 
collaborator and friend. 
Professor Lookofsky's education and experience are in many 
ways the mirror image of Professor Bernstein's. Professor Bernstein, 
as the Dean has noted, was educated first in Kiel and then in 
Hamburg before beginning a distinguished academic and professional 
career in German law. He then came to the United States to study 
American law at Michigan and teach American contract and 
insurance law here. He brought to comparative law the expertise of a 
scholar and practitioner at home in both the common and civil law 
traditions. 
Professor Lookofsky has taken the opposite and, I suspect, more 
difficult and less common route to a similar expertise. Educated at 
Lehigh University and the New York University School of Law, he 
practiced law as an in-house counsel at United Artists before going to 
Denmark to study law at the University of Copenhagen, where he 
joined the faculty in 1981. Professor Lookofsky has been a visiting 
professor at the Universität Freiburg Institut für Internationales 
Privatrecht and here at Duke Law School. In addition to serving as 
Secretary General for the Danish Committee for Comparative Law, 
Professor Lookofsky coordinates student exchange programs with 
Duke Law School and the New York University Law School. 
 
 *** Paul Haagen is Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. 
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I believe alone among the Bernstein lecturers, and probably 
among this audience as well, Professor Lookofsky has the distinction 
of being a member of a chivalric order, having been awarded the 
Order of the Dannebrog by Her Majesty Queen Margrethe II of 
Denmark in September of this year for his distinguished service to 
Denmark. Professor Lookofsky's teaching and publications relate to 
contractual and delictual obligations, sales, private international law, 
commercial arbitration, and comparative law. His lecture today is 
entitled "Desperately Seeking Subsidiarity: Danish private Law in the 
Scandinavian, European, and Global Context." 
Subsidiarity is a principle of European Community Law first 
established and defined in Article 5 of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. 
It is intended to ensure that decisions are taken as closely as possible 
to the citizen, and that the community can only take action if and 
insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the member states. It is somewhat similar, Professor 
Lookofsky has noted, to the principles set out in the Tenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. He will explain why he and 
other Danish jurists are seeking but not finding subsidiarity in the 
private law field.  Professor Lookofsky. 
PROFESSOR JOSEPH M. LOOKOFSKY 
Thank you very much, Paul, for that kind and very generous 
introduction. 
Dean Levi, colleagues, students and friends: Thank you for this 
great honor to lecture at this fine law school today in memory of my 
dear friend and colleague Herbert Bernstein. This is my fifth visit 
here, and I have wonderful memories. 
Last January Dean Levi's predecessor, Dean Bartlett, invited me 
to come here to Duke to lecture comparatively, in Herbert's honor, 
on a topic in Danish or Scandinavian law. In response to that kind 
invitation, I will speak about subsidiarity, mainly within the context of 
Danish, Scandinavian and European private law. Thank you, Paul, for 
helping to me to introduce the subsidiarity concept. That will save me 
a bit of time during the first part of my lecture. 
Now, to help introduce the comparative context of my lecture, I 
ask you to imagine a map composed of concentric circles or rings, a 
map which depicts the "private law universe." 
At the center of this universe, within the innermost circle of this 
map, lies the private law of Denmark. Just outside this, the map's 
second ring depicts private law applicable in all of Scandinavia, in 
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particular, certain private law rule-sets known as the Scandinavian 
"Model Laws." 
Both of these inner rings are surrounded by a third ring which 
represents the law of the European Union,1 and this ring is the one in 
which the concept of subsidiarity lies. 
Finally, we imagine the outermost "global private law" ring, 
which comprises certain private law rule-sets adhered to not only by 
European States, but also by many non-European countries, 
including (e.g.) the United States and China. Within this last ring we 
find such commercially significant treaties as the Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods (CISG) and the New York Convention 
on International Commercial Arbitration. 
This map serves to depict my private law universe, and it's not so 
unusual that I see things from my own location and perspective. After 
all, I've been in Denmark for some thirty five years, and so Denmark 
is the center of my universe, not only as regards private law, but as 
also as regards life and society in general. I realize that might be hard 
for an American audience to understand, since I was born and lived 
here in the United States for twenty seven years, but I have lived in 
Denmark for an even longer period of time, and the center of my 
universe shifted (or at least drifted) towards Scandinavia some time 
ago. 
As I proceed with my lecture, I'll ask you to keep my private law 
universe in mind. I'll use Denmark (the innermost ring) as my starting 
point and then work outwards. Before I tell you about Danish private 
law, I'll say a few things about Danish society in general. I think these 
observations about the societal context might make it easier to 
explain some of the perhaps unusual concepts of Danish law which I 
intend to mention later. 
I will also make a few general points about Scandinavian law. 
There are, to be sure, many similarities between Danish and 
Scandinavian law, but there are also many differences. There is, in 
fact, no real "Scandinavian Law," as there are no (regional) 
Scandinavian rules which regulate conduct throughout Scandinavia,2 
 
 1. The author notes that in a more perfect map of this "private-law universe" the third 
ring would account for the fact that one of the Scandinavian States (Norway) is not a member of 
the European Union. 
 2. A few Scandinavians once dreamed of "federalizing" Scandinavian private law. In 1947, 
a prominent professor at the University of Copenhagen presented his Draft for a Nordic Civil 
Code. Although the idea never took hold anywhere in Scandinavia, his Draft was later 
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but we do have some similar private law legislation in Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden, because these statutes were originally drafted 
on the basis of models which reflect a Scandinavian consensus. So, 
just as parts of the New Jersey version of the UCC closely resemble 
the corresponding parts New York or North Carolina law, because 
they were all drafted on the basis of a uniform model, we find parts of 
Danish private law which resemble parts of Norwegian and Swedish 
private law. 
But my main focus today will be a comparison between Danish 
and European law. That will be the main comparative context. I think 
many of the things I say will also invite other comparisons in your 
own (American) minds, but I must say that from a Danish point of 
view the main comparative interest these days is the relationship 
between Danish law as such and European Community law (which is 
of course becoming part of Danish law as well), as opposed to 
comparisons between Danish and American law. But, as I'm here in 
the United States today, I will also make some comparative 
comments in that American law direction as well. 
There is a trend towards what I permit myself to call the 
"federalization" of Private law in Europe. The word "federalization" 
is in quotation marks here in my notes, since some constitutional 
scholars in Europe would debate or contest the validity of that term, 
at least technically speaking, but there's no question that some key 
areas of private law that were previously the exclusive province of the 
Danish legislator and part of Danish sovereignty have been 
federalized and have become (or been replaced by) European law 
common to all Member-States of the European Union, and Denmark 
is, of course, one of these States. 
I will be illustrating this point as I go along and explaining with 
concrete examples—as many as I have time for—and at the end of my 
lecture I even hope to reach some global comparisons (the outermost 
ring on my map). These comparisons will be few and brief: one is 
about arbitration—the New York Convention on Arbitration, and the 
other one is about the International Sales Convention, the CISG, 
since I hope to say a few words regarding Denmark's special position 
in relation to these two significant treaties. 
Well, I don't have to tell you what "subsidiarity" means, since 
Paul [Haagen] did that for me, but you might still ask why I (or 
 
published in English. See FR. VINDING KRUSE, A NORDIC DRAFT CODE (Else Giersing trans., 
Munksgaard 1963). 
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anybody) might be desperately seeking that? Well, a lot of people are 
desperately seeking something these days. Indeed, when I Googled 
the words "desperately seeking," I got more than two million hits.3 A 
large number of them, it seems, were related to the film entitled 
Desperately Seeking Susan (with Susan played by Madonna, herself) – 
that film was, by the way, one of the "top ten" films of 1985.4 
And then there are the many others, those desperately seeking 
other things—everything from snoozin' (a good night's sleep) to 
sanity. 
But why seek subsidiarity? Well, if you search for the term in 
Google (one of the great sources of law these days actually), you'll 
see that subsidiarity had its origins in Catholic Church doctrine from 
the late 1800's. So, even the Church once sought subsidiarity. And 
though this information (subsidiarity's religious origin) is actually 
quite interesting,5 I won't take the time right now to say more about 
that. 
Instead, I'd like to discuss what subsidiarity means in the 
European Union context. As you said, Paul, the term became 
prominent in 1992, around the same time that the European 
Community was moving towards (developing into) the European 
Union. I think it's fair to say that subsidiarity, as it was used then, was 
a kind of signal to the peoples of Europe who thought (and feared) 
that Europe was harmonizing too quickly, becoming one single 
"State." To counter (or slow down) that trend, the European 
Community, and later the Union, could "put the brakes on," if you 
will, by using the subsidiarity concept. 
In Danish we "translate" (or re-write) the term subsidiarity to 
something we call—get ready—"nærhedsprincippet."6 This is 
(literally) the "closeness-principle," the idea that decisions should be 
taken as closely as possible to the citizens. I think that (our own freely 
translated) version serves to explain the ideological aspect of 
subsidiarity. 
 
 3. Google, http://www.google.com/ (search "desperately seeking") (last visited Oct. 5, 
2008). 
 4. RogerEbert.com, Movie Answer Man, http://rogerebert.suntimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/arti 
cle?A ID=/20070816/ANSWERMAN/70817006/1023 (last visited Oct. 5, 2008). 
 5. Interested readers can easily obtain a wealth of information on this subject.  See, e.g., 
Google, http://www.google.com/ (search "subsidiarity, Catholic Church") (last visited Oct. 5, 
2008). 
 6. Pronounced in Danish (something) like this: nair–heds–prin–seep–it. 
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And then we have the more technical, "constitutional" aspect of 
subsidiarity, and this is the idea that the European Union does not (or 
at least should not) take action unless such (centralized/federalized/ 
European) action is deemed to be more effective than action taken at 
the national level. 7 The Union should, in other words, not go beyond 
what is "necessary." 
But even that, I would venture to say (and I'm not a 
constitutional scholar), is also at the moment a kind of an ideological 
concept. It's just a signal; it hasn't really "put the brakes on."  
Denmark did, to be sure, send a shockwave through the Community 
by voting "No" to the Union in 1992, and for a brief period our "no" 
put the brakes on the entire unionization of Europe. So it was 
perhaps then appropriate that the European Council sent the signal 
of subsidiarity, saying: "Don't worry Denmark; we're not going to 
take over more than is absolutely necessary in terms of federalizing 
European law." 
The more recent (draft) European Constitution – which was 
subsequently renamed the (draft) Reform Treaty (to make it sound 
less "federal," I suppose)—includes provisions purportedly enhancing 
the principle of subsidiarity.8 As expressed in the Treaty on the 
European Union,9 the principle "is intended to ensure that decisions 
are taken as closely as possible to the citizen and that constant checks 
are made as to whether action at Community level is justified in the 
light of the possibilities available at the national, regional or local 
level."10 
Together with this new version of the subsidiarity principle, the 
Reform Treaty establishes an "Early Warning System," which gives 
the individual EU Member States the chance to say: "Wait, please 
don't federalize that, if you are going in that direction." Essentially, 
the warning system permits national parliaments to "ask the 
 
 7. Except in the areas within its "exclusive competence", see Europa Glossary, 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/subsidiarity_en.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2008), and we can 
leave that exception alone, since it does not concern us here today. 
 8. See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, Protocol on the Application of the Principles of 
Subsidiarity and Proportionality, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 150, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007 :306:SOM:EN:HTML [hereinafter Lisbon Treaty]. 
 9. See also Treaty on European Union, tit. II, art. G(B)(5), Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 
1, amended by Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties 
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, art. 5, para. 2, Oct. 2, 1997, 
1997 O.J. (C 340) 57. 
 10. See generally Europa Glossary, supra note 7. 
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Commission to review a legislative proposal if they consider that it 
violates the principle."11 
Well, as I said, I am going to be looking at this from the point of 
view of a "private" lawyer, and since the term "private law" (in 
Danish: privatret) sounds more European than American, I'll try to 
explain it this way: Private law is, quite simply, what I do. It's not a 
strange thing. In some legal systems, I should say, the distinction 
between private and public law has technical and important 
significance. We have a scholar here today, Ralf Michaels, who has 
written about that,12 and all I want to say is that in Denmark the 
distinction is of no particular significance. It's just a convenient 
division of labor among faculty members. Some "do" private law and 
some public law. People who do public law concern themselves with 
constitutional law, criminal law, administrative law, whereas the 
people who do private law do things like contracts, torts and 
property. I "do" obligations and that includes contractual obligations, 
as well as delictual obligations (the things you call torts), and I also do 
private international law and comparative law as they relate to 
contract and tort. 
Now, that is a non-American way of doing things, I think. In the 
United States, and even in much of Europe, private international law, 
also known as conflicts of law, is something that is done by specialists, 
and I think that we have some of those specialists with us today. In 
Europe, in Denmark at least, it is not uncommon for the person doing 
contracts to be responsible for comparing (e.g.) Danish contract law 
to the contract law of other legal systems—contracts in German law, 
American law etc.—and also to address related conflict-of-laws 
matters, including the applicable law (choice of law). So I do these 
things too.  It's a system (division of labor) which has both advantages 
and disadvantages, which I won't go into now. I just wanted to explain 
what I mean by private law when I talk about it. 
And now I would like to take you on an imaginary trip, a tour 
from the Duke University Law School, located on Science Drive in 
Durham North Carolina, to the place I work in Copenhagen, which is 
on Studiestræde (that means "Study Street," which is quite similar to 
the German term). 
 
 11. See Europa Glossary, Together 50 Years - Subsidiarity, http://www.together50years.eu/ 
EN/gloss/index.htm. 
 12. See generally Ralf Michaels & Nils Jansen, Private Law Beyond the State? 
Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 843 (2006). 
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There are, of course, various ways to get to Denmark from Duke. 
If you were to go eastward, as the crows or jets fly, towards what is 
now the tiny Kingdom of Denmark, you would pass by parts of the 
formerly enormous Kingdom of Denmark. We ruled Greenland 
(which we still "rule," though they wouldn't like me to say it that way; 
they now have "home rule"). Denmark also ruled most of Norway 
and even part of Sweden at one time. It was indeed an enormous 
kingdom, and a mighty one – you know, the Vikings and all of that. 
But, we could also approach Denmark from the south, which I 
think is more interesting today, because if we came up that way, the 
way the Roman Legions did, we would pass through what is now the 
German Duchy of Schleswig, and we would pass the Eider River. But 
if we did what the Romans did, we would actually stop at the Eider, 
because there is (or at least was) a stone there saying (excuse my 
Latin): Eidora Romani Terminus Imperii, (i.e.) "The Roman Empire 
Stops Here."13 
And that inscription remains significant today, because the "Civil 
law" stops there, too. And it is incorrect, although a common error, to 
include Scandinavian law within the Civil law group of law families. 
There are, to be sure, numerous similarities between Scandinavian 
and Civil law; many of them came afterwards, when we stole or 
borrowed or imitated a lot of German principles in certain fields, 
including private law. But the Scandinavian States never adopted the 
super-structure of the Civil law system, and that fact might help you 
understand some of the things I am going to say about the 
Scandinavian position on the world comparative map, and more 
specifically, the Danish position. 
Before moving further in that direction, however, I thought that 
it might be appropriate to say something about the societal context, 
"where I'm coming from," if you will, after living and working in 
Denmark for some 35 years. 
Denmark is the oldest kingdom in the world. It was originally 
ruled by King Knud14 (his Danish name was later translated as 
"Canute") and the Viking tribe that he led. And the term "tribe" is 
still used about the Danish people, because Denmark is such a tightly 
knit society, such a small and nearly homogeneous society that it is 
 
 13. See, e.g., Wikipedia, http://www.wikipedia.org/ (search "Eider River") (last visited Oct. 
5, 2008). 
 14. Pronounced: Keh-nood (as in "noodle"). 
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often figuratively speaking described as a tribe. And I'll give you 
some examples of that. 
Today, we're not only a kingdom; we're also a modern Welfare 
State. That's Welfare with a capital "W" (welfare is not a dirty word 
for us). 
And ours is also an extremely Democratic society (another key 
Danish word). Today, as fate would have it, there is a parliamentary 
election in Denmark.15 It is a very closely contested election, and it 
looks like we are going to go over 85% in terms of voter turnout, 
which is going to break the Danish record. And that is also the 
highest voter-participation in the world, if we exclude the countries 
where you must vote (by law). 
So, we are going to break our own record today. And when we 
do that, 98% of the people who cast their votes will be represented by 
politicians with seats in the Danish Parliament (Folketing).16 It is not a 
winner-take-all system, which is not so unusual for parliamentary 
democracies, but it is unusual when the cutoff or borderline is as low 
as 2%, as it is in Denmark, and that means that nearly everyone in 
Denmark is represented in Parliament by someone who shares his or 
her political view, and that fact, some of us think, may contribute to 
the very peaceful nature of the Danish society. If people want to "do 
battle" and argue about things, they do it in the Parliament and not 
on the streets. 
Well, what else should I say about Danish society? Other key 
words on my list here include Compromise, Realism, and 
Pragmatism. I'll be returning to these concepts, but I should also 
mention Secularity: Denmark might well be the least religious 
country in the world. Don't be fooled by the large symbol on the 
Danish flag; ours is a very secular society. We don't have politicians 
talking about religion during our elections, at least not in the sense of 
wearing their religion (if they have one) on their sleeves.17 
 
 15. The election in Denmark was held on the same date as this Bernstein Memorial 
Lecture at Duke University School of Law: 13 November 2007. 
 16. See Folketinget, http://www.folketinget.dk (follow "English" hyperlink) (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2008). 
 17. See generally PAUL ZUCKERMAN, SOCIETY WITHOUT GOD: WHAT THE LEAST 
RELIGIOUS NATIONS CAN TELL US ABOUT CONTENTMENT (2008).  During a press conference 
televised on Danish public television on 28 February 2007, the Danish Prime Minister said: "In 
my opinion, we should have less religion in the public space (det offentlige rum)."  Fogh Strongly 
Condemns Religious Særhensyn, DR NYHEDER, Feb. 28, 2007, http://www.dr.dk/Nyheder/ 
Politik/2007/02/28/113931.htm. See John Hansen & Kim Hundevadt, The Cartoon Crisis—How 
It Unfolded, UDLAND.JP.DK, Mar. 11, 2008, http://jp.dk/udland/article1292543.ece (regarding 
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We also have great Prosperity in Denmark. The Danish Kroner 
is strong (we don't have the Euro, but we have linked ourselves firmly 
to it). And we have a concept called Flexicurity,18 which even the 
French are thinking about imitating: security and flexibility in the job 
market. We have "S & M" as well: do you know what that is? 
Socialized Medicine! And we are happy about that. We don't really 
call it that; we just call it the Healthcare System.19 But everyone in 
Denmark is covered by it, and it works fairly well. 
Sharing, Honesty and Happiness. We are also "number one" in 
these categories.20 Denmark is on top in Sharing in the sense of having 
the smallest disparity between rich and poor in the world (closely 
followed by, I think, Bangladesh, which it is of course on a different 
scale).21 Denmark also has lots of Honesty, in the sense that we have – 
according to the people who do these surveys, I don't know how they 
do them – the least corruption in the world.22 And then there's 
Happiness: how do they measure that? Well, however they measure 
it, they tell us that we are the happiest people in the world.23 Some 
have contested that and said: "Well, you Danes don't have very high 
expectations; that's why." 
We are also "number one" is some other categories, including— 
this is the downside I guess— Taxation. Of course, you need high 
Taxation (and Sharing) to get the very, very small disparity between 
the wealthy and the poor; we have, in fact, no "poor" in Denmark in 
the sense that you (in America) understand poor. That is the result of 
heavy taxation, heavily progressive heavy taxation. But Danish 
 
the Danish "Cartoon Crisis", which engendered considerable political debate in Denmark and 
elsewhere, both about religion and freedom of speech). 
 18. See, e.g., Wikipedia, http://www.wikipedia.org/ (search "Flexicurity") (last visited Oct. 
5, 2008). 
 19. In Danish: Sundhedssystemmet. 
 20. According to various surveys easily accessible in Google. See infra notes 21-23 and 
accompanying text. 
 21. See, e.g., Financial Security–Income Distribution, http://www4.hrsdc.gc.ca/indicator.jsp? 
lang=en&indicatorid=22 (last visited Oct. 5, 2008) (describing the Gini coefficient, which 
measures income disparity, ranged from 22.5 for Denmark to 48 for Mexico). 
 22. Tied for first place with Finland and New Zealand. Infoplease, The 2006 Transparency 
International Corruption Perceptions Index, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0781359.html (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2008) (providing the 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index scores). See also 
Christian Bjørnskov, Combating Corruption: On the Interplay Between Institutional Quality 
and Social Trust (unpublished and undated manuscript, on file with the author). 
 23. This has been the case for several years running. See Denmark 'Happiest' Country in 
the World, CNN, July 2, 2008, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/HEALTH/07/02/nations.happiness/; 
Denmark 'Happiest Place on Earth,' BBC NEWS, July 28, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk 
/2/hi/5224306.stm. 
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people pay it willingly, and the voting (in the Parliamentary election) 
today is not about whether we should have less taxes, but rather 
about whether we should reorganize the taxes. 
Moonlighting is another negative: it seems we have the highest 
rate of moonlighting in the civilized world.24 Teenage Drinking – we 
have a lot of that too. And then we have problems associated with 
what I might label "Tribal Initiation." I'm not sure whether we are 
first in that category, but we certainly have had a lot of publicity 
about it, especially as regards "initiating" foreign newcomers as 
Members of the Danish Tribe, which is, as I said, a societal system 
characterized by high participatory Democracy and high Sharing 
(redistribution of wealth). These things have been hard for some 
newcomers to understand, and so it's been hard for them to become 
Members of the Danish Tribe.25 
Well, now that you know the societal background, or at least 
something about it, I return to the subject of Danish private law. My 
first Danish private law book was a book about called "Den 
Borgerlige Ret." This was in 1975, in my first course in elementary 
Danish contract law. This was my first "hornbook," if you will. I have 
it with me here today, and I'd like to translate one sentence in it. It 
says this: "Article 1 (§ 1) of the Danish Contracts Act lays down the 
fundamental rule that promises and contracts are legally binding." 
I read that a few times in 1975: "Promises – and therefore also 
contracts – are legally binding." And then I began another kind of 
desperate search, desperately seeking (but not finding) some key 
concepts I had learned during my American legal education, things 
like "consideration,"26 writing requirements and other formalities. 
And if you searched today (instead of in 1975) you might, as an 
American-educated jurist, also look for (but not find) the Law and 
Economics concept of "efficient breach." 
 
 24. Also sometimes referred to as the "black economy". The Danish Tax Department 
considers "[m]oonlighting [to be] when you are offered and accept a job where neither you nor 
your employer informs SKAT [the Tax Authorities] about the employment and the pay you 
receive." SKAT, TAX IN DENMARK, 18 (2005) available at http://www.skat.dk/Vejledninger/ 
Personserien/Pnr_37_eng2005.pdf. 
 25. Author's note: Lest I be accused of jingoism, I'll readily admit that my lecture-
statement on this point oversimplifies a complex set of related problems—some of them also 
attributable to the way some Native (born-in-Denmark) Tribal Members treat newcomers to 
Danish territory. 
 26. E.g. Wikipedia, http://www.wikipedia.org/ (search "consideration") (last visited Oct. 5, 
2008) (defining consideration as the "value paid for a promise"). 
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Well, I searched for some of these things in 1975, but I found 
none of them. There is no consideration requirement in Danish law. 
Indeed, there are, quite simply no formalities at all. No contract needs 
to be "supported" by consideration, nor does any contract need to in 
writing. 
Nor do many Danish jurists concern themselves with "efficient 
breach," not even today, and there are several reasons for this. There 
happens to be an article in the American Journal of Comparative 
Law this month which explains why many Civil law systems are not 
interested in efficient breach.27 I won't go into that in detail, but I will 
say that the core explanation for us is that promises are not only 
"legally binding" in Denmark; they are also morally binding, and so 
how could Danish lawyers go out and encourage people to 
(efficiently) breach their promises? It would not work very well. 
So, in our "homemade" (pre-EC and pre-EU) version of Danish 
private law, promises are binding, period, Well, at least all reasonable 
promises are binding, because there's another rule in the Contracts 
Act which guards against unreasonable contract terms.28 That too 
applies to all contracts: consumer contracts, contracts between 
merchants, whatever. There are, to be sure, weak and strong 
merchants, and the prohibition against unreasonable terms, including 
promises which would be unreasonable to enforce, is applied more 
restrictively as between merchants, but it's there and it's the same 
rule. 
As for our "homemade" law of Torts, I'll mention one principle 
now, and I'll follow up with a more concrete illustration later. 
Imagine that we have a defective product, and that a consumer who 
buys that that product is injured. The seller of the product is liable 
under Danish law. Why is the seller liable? Because the Danish 
judges who make (judge-made) private law decided that he should be 
liable.  Is that a contractual principle? No, because the legislators who 
wrote the Danish Sales Act29 more than 100 years ago were of the 
opinion that contractual rules were not well-suited for product 
liability cases. So even the immediate seller's liability is based on a 
tort principle, but it's a (near) strict liability principle: you can sue the 
 
 27. Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Why No Efficient Breach in the Civil Law?: A Comparative 
Assessment of the Doctrine of Efficient Breach of Contract, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 721, 721 (2007). 
 28. See Aftalelov, 1986-96, § 36 (Den.) translated in http://www.sprog.asb.dk/sn 
/Danish%20 Contracts%20Act.pdf [hereinafter Aftalelov]. 
 29. Købeloven, (1906), as subsequently amended, translated in http://www.sprog.asb.dk/sn/ 
Danish%20Sale%20of%20Goods%20Act.pdf. 
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seller with whom you have a contractual relationship –or even if you 
don't, a member of your family can sue him – and the seller will be 
held liable unless he can prove that the producer is (without fault and 
therefore) not liable.  This was at least the law made by our judges. 
I'll return to a more concrete example, which illustrates how EU law 
has changed our law in this area, in a minute.30 
I realize that I'm presenting a rather abrupt list of rules, but I do 
want to mention another private law rule now, one that applies to 
both contract and tort, and that rule says: no unreasonable 
compensation. Not only are unreasonable contract terms not binding 
in Denmark, but even when a binding promise is broken, the party 
injured is not necessarily entitled to full-blown "expectation 
protection." There's a regulatory mechanism, codified by statute 
actually, which limits compensation (in both contract and tort) to 
what a Danish judge would consider to be a "reasonable" amount.31 
So, you see, the reasonableness-principle pervades Danish 
private law. I have one nice illustration of the fact that unreasonable 
contract terms do not bind. Our daughter Sarah is living in New York 
now. She's going to be married in the Kingdom of Denmark this 
summer, and she was in the process of contracting with a Danish 
provider of services for her wedding. When she found the standard 
terms of one prospective provider on line, she sent me an e-mail with 
a link to them, asking: "Dad, can I click yes to this?". I answered her 
without even looking: "Don't worry about that," I said, "because 
even if there are any unreasonable terms in there, they're not 
binding." So she clicked yes, and that was that. 
I looked at those terms later, by the way, and they were quite 
reasonable, from a Danish point of view. There was, for one thing, no 
arbitration clause among them. Such a clause might not be 
unreasonable per se in Denmark, but we simply don't have any 
Danish merchants who include arbitration clauses in their consumer 
contracts, probably because the merchants would not expect them to 
bind. I think our general prohibition against unreasonable contract 
terms reflects a more paternalistic attitude than the corresponding, 
yet "milder" rule in the United States, i.e., the rule that 
"unconscionable" promises are not binding. I think that 
 
 30. See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. 
 31. See Erstatningsansvarsloven [Liability for Damages Act], No. 885 (2005) (Den.) § 24, 
translated in http://uk.patientforsikringen.dk/legislation/erstatningsansvarsloven.html   [herein 
after Erstatningsansvarsloven]. 
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"unreasonable" is, as it sounds, a more flexible and more intrusive 
term than unconscionable. I wouldn't say that the difference is 
enormous, but it certainly is a difference in spirit. 
I think it's time to move on now and say something about the 
sources of Danish private law - where do all these rules that I'm 
talking about come from? These flexible and open-ended legal rules, 
the sources of what I've been calling "home-made"(i.e.) Danish-made 
private law. 
First, I'd like to highlight the word for "law" in the Scandinavian 
legal systems. The Scandinavian languages are very close on this 
point: the word for law is "ret" in Danish, "rett" in Norwegian, and 
"rät" in Swedish (we have a Swede here in the audience today: am I 
doing this well?). Interestingly, all these versions of the word mean 
more than just "law," they also mean right. The Scandinavian word 
for law is the same as the Scandinavian word for right. There's 
something nice about that. Maybe I'm being a bit sentimental, but I 
think there's something nice about that. 
What about statutes and legislative codifications? The word for 
"law" can also be used to mean (a) "formal law" in the sense of a 
legislative enactment, a statute. That helps explain why my heading 
on this point is: Make love, not codes. I took a copyright on that 
phrase (by tagging a © to it in my Power Point), because I thought it 
was quite cute. (I used to be a copyright lawyer at United Artists 
Corporation, you know.) Well, the fact is that the plural of the Danish 
word for law happens to be "love," but this plural form is pronounced 
– not like you pronounce "love" in English, but rather – as a two-
syllable word: low – vuh.  Say the word for law in the singular, and it's 
pronounced "low." Say the plural, however, and you can hear the "v" 
(in vuh). 
But my main point here is that Danes make laws; they don't make 
Codes. Danish legislators have been enacting statutes on private law 
subjects for centuries, but they have never enacted a comprehensive 
Civil Code. As I said earlier, the Roman Empire (and Roman law) 
stopped at the Eider River,32 and that helps explain why we never got 
a general Civil Code, as in France and Germany and other Civil law 
systems. These days, when the European Union is moving, step by 
step, towards a European Civil Code,33 we Danish jurists are nervous 
 
 32. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 33. See generally TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE (Arthur Hartkamp et al. eds., 3d 
ed. 2004).  The seemingly innocuous "Common Frame of Reference" is, in my view, just the first 
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about that. We have never had a Code; we don't have the tradition 
for it; and we are worried about it. 
What we do have at the "home-made" level are a few basic 
pieces of legislation within the private law area, the most notable 
being the Danish Sales Act.34 It's quite similar in its coverage to 
Article 2 of the American UCC.35 Another key Danish statute is the 
Contracts Act, which has a broader field of application: it applies not 
just to sales transactions; it also covers other contractual topics (which 
the UCC covers with respect to sales), such as contract formation. 
The prohibition against unreasonable contract terms, which I 
mentioned previously,36 is in the Contracts Act.37 And then there's the 
Liability for Damages Act,38 which tells judges how to measure 
liability, particularly in tort cases. The Liability Act also contains the 
general liability-limitation I told you about,39 so that plaintiffs don't 
get unreasonable compensation (in contract or tort). 
These, I think, are our main private law statutes. But we also 
have judge-made law in Denmark.  Indeed, since we have relatively 
little (detailed) statutory regulation, we have to rely quite on a lot of 
judge-made law. That probably doesn't surprise the American 
audience here.  But our judge-made law might well surprise a Civilian 
jurist. We Danish jurists don't regard our judges as do the French, for 
example, as the "bouche de la loi" – the mouthpiece of the (French) 
legislature. Our Danish judges really make law, and everyone 
recognizes it. But they make it in a way that is different from the way 
it's made here in the States. It's made in a way that is less obvious. 
For one thing, our judges write very brief decisions. The longest 
part of a Danish judgment simply accounts for the facts of the case 
and the arguments of the opposing lawyers. The decision itself and 
the rationale underlying that decision – the ratio, sometimes also 
referred to as the premises (præmisserne) - are very briefly stated, 
usually fitting within a single paragraph. The premises need only send 
a brief "signal" as regards the main factors that have gone into the 
 
slice of the coming, fully codified pie.  For recent developments, see, e.g., Study Group on a 
European Civil Code, http://www.sgecc.net/pages/en/home/index.welcome.htm (last visited Oct. 
5, 2008).  See also infra notes 50, 69 and accompanying text. 
 34. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 35. U.C.C. art. 2 (2004). 
 36. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 37. See Aftalelov, supra note 28. 
 38. See Erstatningsansvarsloven, supra note 31. 
 39. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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judge's decision, because the judge is not trying to "set a precedent," 
he's trying to decide the concrete case. 
I know a fair amount about this aspect of Danish law, because I 
often work with judges. I work with them not only because Danish 
judges also sometimes serve as arbitrators (and so I sometimes get to 
sit on arbitration tribunals with them), but also because Danish 
judges also serve as external examiners (censors), helping us grade 
Danish law school exams. When we talk about the solutions to a 
complicated problem on an essay exam in the law of contracts, for 
example, or in the law of tort, the judges often have the outcome in 
mind. These judges are, of course, not ignoring the applicable rules, 
but it's not necessarily the rules that push them towards the outcome. 
It's rather as if they first sense the outcome – what they feel is just and 
right (which goes back to the fact that they too went to law school) – 
and then they test that result by looking at the premises (the ratio – 
which in an exam situation is set forth in the "model answer") to see 
if the premises do indeed "lead" to that just result. Is that putting the 
horse before the cart or the cart before the horse? I'm not sure. It's 
something which Patrick Attiyah from England (I think he's been at 
this law school as well), has called reasoning backwards. It's not a 
concept to which we claim copyright, but it's something which we 
adhere to in practice.40 
I think the result of all of this is that Danish private law is made 
up of two main components, statutory law and judge-made law, each 
in a special Danish variation, what you might call "legislation light" 
and "precedent light." For these reasons, among others, the Danish 
system is an unusual system. 
I can see that I have to move along now if I want to get to some 
concrete examples, so that I can illustrate how Danish law is 
characterized by pragmatism as well as realism. 
My first example, inspired by a real Danish case,41 concerns a guy 
named Mr. Skov.  He's a farmer who runs an egg business, producing 
eggs.  He sells the eggs to "Bilka", a large Danish supermarket (a bit 
like Wal-Mart), and two consumers (named Jette and Michael) who 
buy those eggs from Bilka make what Danes call an "egg cake." As it 
 
 40. See Joseph Lookofsky, The Limits of Commercial Contract Freedom: Under the 
UNIDROIT 'Restatement' and Danish Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 485, 490 & n.33 (1998). 
 41. The facts here are inspired by Danish (City and High Court) decisions which led to the 
preliminary ruling issued on 10 Jan. 2006 by the European Court of Justice. Case C-402/03, Skov 
Æg v Bilka Lavprisvarehus, 2006 E.C.R. I-00199. 
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turns out the eggs are tainted with salmonella, and the consumers 
become seriously ill. Who can they sue? 
Well, if we apply traditional (pre EC/EU) Danish judge-made 
(pro-consumer) rules to decide this one,42 the consumers don't need 
to locate the egg-producer (Mr. Skov, whose name isn't on the box 
anyway). They just go right to the supermarket (Bilka) and let that 
middleman-seller worry about who ultimately might be left holding 
the bag (i.e., Bilka or Mr. Skov). This product liability action against 
the supermarket is not a contractual action under Danish law.43 It's a 
tort action based on Danish judge-made rules of law. I suspect the 
nature of the judge-made law underlying this action was later 
misunderstood by the European Court of Justice,44 but please excuse 
me if I'm wrong about that. 
Another example, also based on a real Danish case:45 Two Danes 
prepare to go on a hunting trip. They find each other by way of a 
hunting journal in Denmark. They rent a car in Scotland and buy 
insurance there in accordance with Scottish law. They have an 
accident, and the passenger dies due to the driver's negligence (no 
question about that). The widow then tries to sue the Danish driver in 
Denmark, but the defendant argues that the action is time-barred 
under Scottish law, because the lawyer hired by the widow waited 
more than three years before commencing legal action against the 
driver. But the action is not time-barred under Danish law, because 
here we have a five year statute of limitations. How should the judges 
in the Danish Court of Appeal decide? 
If we translate the essence of the decision – it fills no more than a 
small paragraph – we see that the judges quickly list the main factors 
which they found relevant, and then briefly add their conclusion (the 
outcome) to that. It goes something like this: the accident occurred in 
Scotland in a car registered there, and the driver was covered by 
 
 42. As did the lower (City) court judge. Id. para. 16. 
 43. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 44. See Skov, 2006 E.C.R. I-00199. Although a detailed explanation of the basis for my 
disagreement with the ECJ ruling lies outside the scope of the present (lecture) discussion, my 
main point is that a better understanding of the nature of the Danish judge-made rules of (tort) 
liability by the ECJ might well have led to an interpretation of Article 13 of the Product 
Liability Directive which preserved the viability of the Danish (middleman-liability) rule.  See 
infra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 45. Based on the decision of the Danish High Court, reported in [B] UGESKRIFT FOR 
RETSVÆSEN 886 (1982). 
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compulsory Scottish insurance. For these reasons, the dispute should 
be governed by Scottish law, and so the action is time-barred.46 
Now you might not like the reasoning or the result, but you have 
to think about it. In the well-considered view of one Danish professor 
(who later became a Danish Supreme Court judge), the outcome 
(time-bar) in this case was hardly "dictated" by the formalistic 
application of choice-of-law rules. Quite the contrary: the outcome 
was quite likely rather the result of pragmatic considerations and the 
principle of reasonableness.47 
In other words, it was not so much a question of how to make the 
(formal) choice of law between Scottish and Danish law (and their 
respective time-bars), but rather a question of how to reach the 
"best" result, i.e., the most reasonable result, or the "least unfair" 
result. Should the court let the widow suffer because of the negligence 
of the driver? Or should it let the driver suffer because the widow 
chose a lawyer who took no action against that driver until the 
insurance protecting him had expired?48 Tough decision. The judges 
in the Danish High Court of Appeal made what they thought was the 
"right call," and they could do it that way because the applicable 
(Danish) judge-made rule of private international law was flexible, so 
as not to "dictate" an unreasonable result in a difficult situation. I 
can't give you all the details of this, I haven't got the time. Too many 
of you will leave if I did it. 
This was, at any rate, the (pre-EU) way Danish judges used to 
handle many cases like these.  If we imagine a time-line depicting the 
development of Danish private law, we would see how Denmark 
 
 46. For a more accurate translation, see JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY & KETILBJORN HERTZ, EU-
PIL. EUROPEAN UNION PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTRACT AND TORT 
(forthcoming 2009), which reads as follows: 
The accident occurred in Scotland while [defendant] and [plaintiff] used a car 
registered in that country, which was covered by compulsory liability insurance 
according to Scots law.  Therefore, the dispute should be governed by Scots law.  
The [plaintiffs] are debarred from starting legal proceedings in Scotland pursuant to 
section 17 of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, as the statutory 
3-year period has elapsed.  The High Court finds that this provision cannot be 
disregarded in proceedings commenced in a Danish court even though it is [or at 
least was, when this decision was rendered] a procedural rule under Scots law. 
Consequently, the High Court finds for [the defendant]. 
 47. See Jørgen Nørregard in [B] UGESKRIFT FOR RETSVÆSEN 47 (1985).  "Should the fact 
that the lawyer chosen by the plaintiff (herself) did nothing (for more than 3 years) affect the 
outcome of the plaintiff's case, especially considering that this same failure removed the 
defendant from the shelter of Scottish insurance coverage?" 
 48. Id. 
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moved from a period where we made all our own laws to the year 
when Denmark joined the EC. That was in 1972. Twenty years later, 
the concept of subsidiarity was introduced in response to the Danish 
"no" to the European Union (in 1992). Later, Denmark joined that 
Union (with 4 notable "reservations" or "opt-outs"),49 and the Union 
subsequently moved Denmark and the other Member States further 
in the direction of private law federalization. Ultimately, I fear we 
may get "total" private law harmonization: a European Civil Code. 
We are certainly moving in that direction.50 
I'm in the minority on this, one of the relatively few academics 
resisting the creeping federalization of Danish private law. And since 
we in the minority can hardly withstand the "full-court press" being 
exerted by our European opponents, I know we can't win the game. 
Where is this process of federalization taking us? We're moving 
away from the Danish rule which simply says that contracts are 
unenforceable if the enforcement would be unreasonable, taking into 
account all the circumstances. That's our Contracts Act rule from 
1976.51  Here's where we're going: to a list of 17 presumptively unfair 
terms from Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts.52 
That's the way the EU does things like that, by listing detailed 
examples. They tell you, "this is unfair, this is unfair, this unfair" and 
so on. To be sure, we in Denmark don't necessarily disagree with 
these EU details. We'd agree, for example, that arbitration clauses in 
consumer contracts are presumptively unfair.53 But we don't want to 
clutter our Contracts Act and "pollute" its legislative simplicity with 
all these details. So Denmark and Sweden decided to implement the 
Directive of Unfair Contract Terms without including all these details, 
by simply continuing to ban (all) unreasonable contract terms. We got 
sued by the EC for not including the "Grey List" of seventeen (17) 
unreasonable terms from the Directive in our legislative text, and 
 
 49. The recent Irish "no" to the Lisbon Treaty, supra note 8, has had the effect of 
cementing the Danish opt-outs, at least for the time-being.  See Bruno Waterfield, Denmark 
Calls Off Vote on EU Opt-outs, TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Aug. 8, 2008, available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ europe/denmark/2522903/Denmark-calls-off-vote-
on-EU-opt-outs.html. 
 50. See generally Joseph Lookofsky, The Harmonization of Private and Commercial Law: 
"Towards a European Civil Code," 39 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. L. 111 (2000), available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/lookofsky14.html. 
 51. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 52. See Council Directive 93/13, art. 3(3), 1993 O.J. (L 095) (EC). 
 53. Id. at Annex (q). 
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luckily we won, since the European Court of Justice agreed that our 
non-inclusion of the grey list in the black letter of our statute did not 
provide proof that we planned to ignore the list.54 
Now, how would our example about the salmonella-tainted eggs 
turn out now that the EC court has issued a preliminary ruling on 
that? Not the same result as before.55 These poor consumers cannot 
sue the supermarket on the basis of our traditional judge-made rules, 
because we now know, having been brought into the EC court twenty 
years after our implementation of the Product Liability Directive,56 
that Article 13 of the Directive does not leave room for the Danish 
judge-made rules which would allow the consumers to sue the 
supermarket. This is the way that the EC court interpreted the 
Directive, and I think that they may have interpreted it in this way 
because they didn't fully understand the nature of tort liability under 
Danish judge-made law. They said we could make a supplementary 
fault-based rule.57 We could also make a contractual rule, as England 
has, and I think we're going to have to do it now because we need to 
reinstate an action against sellers, but I doubt whether we'll get back 
to our previous pro-consumer state.58 
What about the decision reached by the Danish court in the case 
of the accident in Scotland?59 We would not be able to make that kind 
of decision anymore, at least not under Rome II.60 The judges can't 
make their call as to what they think is the right decision in this kind 
 
 54. See Case C-478/99, Comm'n v. Sweden, 2002 E.C.R. I-4147, para. 24. 
 55. See Case C-402/03, Skov Æg v Bilka Lavprisvarehus, 2006 E.C.R. I-00199, para. 45. 
 56. Council Directive 1999/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 
May 1999 amending Council Directive 85/374/EEC on the approximation of the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for 
defective products, 1999 O.J. (L141/20) (EC). 
 57. Denmark has now done so (in a recent revision of the Danish Product Liability Act) by 
basing the seller's liability on fault, although with a "reversed burden of proof" on the fault 
issue – thus creating a (pro-consumer) rule which might not be able to withstand scrutiny in the 
ECJ. 
 58. See supra note 57. 
 59. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. 
 60. See Commission Regulation 864/2007, art. 4(2), 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40, 44 [hereinafter 
Rome II]. The purpose of the Rome II Regulation, adopted in 2007, is to harmonize (and thus 
replace) the national conflict-of-laws rules previously applied by the courts of the individual EU 
Member States. The Rome II Regulation will enter into force in all EU Member States except 
Denmark on 11 January 2009, and the Regulation will remain inapplicable in Denmark, unless 
and until Denmark withdraws its reservation to the EU treaty as regards legal and home affairs. 
The Danish situation as regards the Rome II Regulation is thus the same as regards Denmark's 
position vis-à-vis the Rome I Regulation. Regarding Rome I and Rome II, see generally 
LOOKOFSKY AND HERTZ, supra note 46. 
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of case, because the EU wants to have more "certainty" when it 
comes to choice of law. They want every judge in the European 
Union to make the same decision – it doesn't matter whether it's a 
good decision or a good result. They want all judges in a situation like 
this to base their decision on lex communis. Since the two parties 
concerned come from Denmark, it should be Danish law which 
applies, so the action would not be time-barred today.61 
I'm overdramatizing to be sure. But, I don't like the idea that we 
cannot continue to decide a case like this on the basis of what is right: 
on the basis of the result, by putting the result before the more 
technical premises. In fact, I have even complained to the Ministry of 
Justice, arguing that the Rome I Regulation (on the law applicable in 
contractual matters)62 would put us into a "straight jacket." And the 
same certainly goes for Rome II (on the law applicable in tort).63 
Unfortunately, I don't have time to tell you more about that. 
The global situation, at least, is better. The global situation is 
better because it's more flexible. Denmark ratified the New York 
Convention,64 as did the United States, and the Convention requires 
that each Contracting State recognize an arbitration agreement "in 
writing."65 There's a big debate about this rule these days (those of 
you who do arbitration know about this): what's "in writing," and 
what's not? We in Denmark don't much care, since under Danish law, 
no agreement (of any kind) needs to be in writing.  And luckily most 
people interpret the New York Convention to allow for that.  You 
must at least respect arbitration agreements in writing, but you can 
also respect arbitration agreements which are not in writing.66 
At the global level of commercial harmonization we also have 
the CISG— the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods.  I'll just mention Article 16 (in CISG Part II) which says until 
 
 61. See Rome II, supra note 60, art. 4(2).  There is a narrow safety valve in Article 4(3) of 
the Rome II Regulation, id. art. 4(3), which would hardly affect the outcome in a case like this.  
See LOOKOFSKY & HERTZ, supra note 46. 
 62. See Europa, Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome 
Convention), http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l33109.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2008). 
 63. See Europa, The law applicable to non-contractual obligations – The Rome II 
Regulation, http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l16027.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2008). 
 64. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21, U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. 
 65. Id. art. II. 
 66. See U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Law, Report of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law on the Work of Its Thirty-Ninth Session, Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/61/17 
(June 19-July 7, 2006). 
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a contract is concluded an offer may be revoked. And you know 
about this rule - it's similar to the American (Common law) rule 
which permits the offeror to revoke until an acceptance has been 
dispatched. Well, since an offer is a kind of promise, the CISG rule 
means that (some) promises are not binding. And since that runs 
counter to the general Danish rule,67 Article 16 might have stood in 
the way of Denmark's ratification. But the CISG allowed Denmark to 
ratify subject to a reservation under Article 92, a declaration saying 
we would not be bound by CISG Part II. 
I myself have argued that we should retract that CISG 
reservation, since I think it causes more harm than it's worth.68 But 
the reservation does show that it's possible to create a system of 
minimum harmonization which allows Contracting States to breathe 
freely, to take account of local traditions, even as we join forces with 
the larger legal world. 
Where do we go from here? Should we continue to seek 
subsidiary, perhaps even Desperately (with a capital D)? Well, I've 
written a bit about private law harmonization with one of my Danish 
colleagues,69 and we've tried to emphasize that there is, as yet, no real 
subsidiary in Europe – nor has any cost-benefit analysis been 
undertaken, so as to determine whether these harmonizations are 
"profitable" or otherwise necessary. 
But, as I've said, we skeptics are in the minority. Most jurists in 
Europe are seeking (or at least content with) more harmonization; 
some are even seeking a European Civil Code.70 The jurists who 
prefer to emphasize the virtues of harmonization are numerous and 
well-organized,71 and so I think the skeptical minority is quite likely to 
lose. 
Fortunately, I've got an alternative to my desperate (and 
probably futile) search for subsidiarity.  It's what you might call my 
 
 67. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 68. See generally Joseph Lookofsky, Alive and Well in Scandinavia: CISG Part II, 18 J.L. & 
COM. 289 (1999). 
 69. See Mads Bryde Andersen & Joseph Lookofsky, Nationale Aftaleregler og EU-
Integration: Problemer & Lǿsningsmodeller, UGESKRIFT FOR RETSVǼSEN, Dept. B., p. 211 
(2002). 
 70. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. But see generally Pierre Legrand, Against a 
European Civil Code, 60 MOD. L. REV. 44 (1997). 
 71. See, e.g., Study Group on a European Civil Code, supra note 33. 
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Danish "Plan B," and it's simply this: Don't worry, be happy! As I 
said earlier in this lecture, we Danes are Number One in that.72 
I'm going to stop here and just tell you this: I have wonderful 
memories of my five visits at Duke and of the great times that I spent 
with Herbert Bernstein and with his wife Waltraud and my wife 
Vibeke. We were a nice foursome. And we were together in many 
places: in Hamburg, New York, Athens, Bristol, and – last but not 
least – here at Duke Law. 
Thank you very much. 
 
 
 72. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
